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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3622
___________
MICKEY MILES,
Appellant
v.
ARAMARK CORRECTIONAL SERVICE, INC.;
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
FOOD SERVICE PROVIDER FOR CURRAN-FROMHOLD CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY OF THE PHILADELPHIA PRISON SYSTEM; AL WHITE, SUPERVISOR,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF ARAMARK;
MAKEBA, SUPERVISOR, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS AN EMPLOYEE OF ARAMARK; FAIRFAX, SUPERVISOR, INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF ARAMARK; JOHN
TAYLOR, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN
EMPLOYEE OF ARAMARK; CELESTE, SUPERVISOR, INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF ARAMARK; WENDELL
DOE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN
EMPLOYEE OF ARAMARK; MS. K. BROWN, SUPERVISOR, INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF ARAMARK; MR. KINSEY,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF
ARAMARK; MS. R. SHAW, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS AN EMPLOYEE OF ARAMARK
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-1759)
District Judge:  Honorable Stewart Dalzell 
_________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
APRIL 3, 2009
Before:  SLOVITER, AMBRO AND STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(filed: April 6, 2009)
2___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Mickey Miles appeals, pro se, from an order of the District Court dismissing his
complaint alleging that Aramark Correctional Services, Inc. and nine of its employees
(collectively “Aramark”) failed to provide proper Kosher meal service during the 2006
and 2007 Passover holidays.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I.
In June 2006, Miles filed a pro se complaint alleging that Aramark failed to
provide him with Kosher food during the 2006 Passover holiday.  On October 10, because
Aramark had yet to reply to the complaint, the Clerk of the Court entered default
judgment in Miles’ favor pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).  After Aramark filed an
answer, it moved to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) and
60(b).  The District Court granted the motion and appointed Miles counsel.  Miles then
moved for entry of a consent order requiring Aramark to serve him Kosher meals
throughout the 2007 Passover holiday.  Aramark agreed to the order.  Three days later, on
March 23, 2007, Miles changed his mind and moved for withdrawal of the consent order. 
On March 28, 2007, the District Court denied Miles’ March 23 motion and entered a
consent order requiring Aramark to “take all necessary steps” to provide Miles with 25
“exclusively” Kosher meals from April 2, 2007, to April 10, 2007.  The order stipulated
3that if the meals were not provided Miles’ counsel would seek a telephone conference
with the Court.  The order also stated that, assuming Aramark provided the Kosher meals,
Miles would seek dismissal of the case within 10 days after the end of the Passover
holiday, or by April 20, 2007. 
During the Passover holiday, via telephone conference, Miles’ counsel reported
that Aramark had served Miles non-Kosher items, specifically bread, margarine, fruit
drink, and iced tea with corn syrup.  Aramark’s counsel conceded that, on the first full
day of Passover, Aramark mistakenly served Miles a plastic-wrapped piece of bread on
his food tray.  Aramark also explained that it could not purchase Kosher margarine
because it did not meet the universal menu requirements prescribed in Aramark’s contract
with the City of Philadelphia.  As to beverages, Aramark stated that Miles has refused
milk that was in fact Kosher, and that Aramark would provide Kosher orange juice. 
Miles stated that he refused the milk because it was not marked Kosher, Kosher-Dairy, or
Kosher for Passover. 
Aramark maintained a log that documented the meals it served to Miles during
Passover.  The log, which bears Miles’ signatures acknowledging his receipt of the meals,
as well as his refusal of certain items because he deemed them non-Kosher, confirms the
representations his counsel made during the telephone conference call. 
After the holiday passed, and Miles did not move to dismiss the complaint, the
Court asked both parties to advise it whether to enter a dismissal order pursuant to  E.D.
      Rule 41.1(b) states in relevant part that: “Whenever in any civil action counsel shall1
notify the Clerk or the judge to whom the action is assigned that the issues between the
parties have been settled, the Clerk shall, upon order of the judge to whom the case is
assigned, enter an order dismissing the action with prejudice . . . .”
4
Pa. R. 41.1(b).   While Aramark admitted to serving some non-Kosher items to Miles in1
the early days of Passover, it asserted that the vast majority of foods served complied with
the consent order.  Aramark submitted evidence that the dairy products and iced tea it
served to Miles were Kosher.  Miles objected to the application of the substantial
performance doctrine to the violation of a federal court order.  Miles further argued that,
even if it was proper to interpret the order under contract law, the “clear and
unambiguous” terms of the contract militated against dismissing the complaint.  On
August 17, 2007, the District Court, applying the equitable doctrine of substantial
performance, determined that Aramark was entitled to the benefit of the consent order,
and the District Court entered judgment in favor of the defendants.  Miles filed a timely
notice of appeal challenging the District Court’s November 13, 2006 order setting aside
default judgment, the March 28, 2007 order entering the consent order and denying his
motion to withdraw the consent order, and the August 17, 2007 order entering judgment
for Aramark.
II.
We have jurisdiction over the final order of the District Court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.  With one exception, which does not apply here, we review a District Court’s
order setting aside a default judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.  See Budget
5Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).  We review the District Court’s
interpretation of the consent decree de novo.  See Holland v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 246 F.3d
267, 278 (3d Cir. 2001).  Consent decrees are analogous to contracts, and thus “we
interpret them with reference to traditional principles of contract interpretation.”  United
States v. New Jersey, 194 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 1999).
We find that the District Court acted within its discretion by vacating the default
judgment the Clerk entered against Aramark.  The Court’s reinstatement of the case
adheres to our long standing preference “that cases be disposed of on the merits whenever
practicable.”  Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180-81 (3d Cir. 1984).  Here, in
revoking the default judgment, the Court properly balanced the applicable factors: (1)
whether lifting the judgment prejudiced Miles; (2) whether Aramark had a prima facie
meritorious defense; (3) whether Aramark’s defaulting conduct was excusable or
culpable; and (4) the effectiveness of alternative sanctions.  Emcasco Ins. Co. v.
Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1987).  We concur with the District Court that
Aramark had a prima facie defense (that it was not a state actor) and the delay was caused
by excusable neglect rather than bad faith. 
We also agree with the District Court’s holding that Aramark substantially
performed its obligations under the consent order.  Under the theory of substantial
performance, “a technical breach of the terms of a contract is excused, not because
compliance with the terms is objectively impossible, but because actual performance is so
6similar to the required performance that any breach that may have been committed is
immaterial.”  15 Williston on Contracts § 44:52 (4th ed. 2008); see also Atlantic LB, Inc.
v. Vrbicek, 905 A.2d 552, 558 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (“The doctrine [of substantial
performance] is intended for the protection and relief of those who have faithfully and
honestly endeavored to perform their contracts in all material and substantial particulars.”
(internal quotations omitted)).
Here, a review of the meal log indicates that, after the first day of Passover, Miles
refused only milk, tea, and condiments.  Thus, at a minimum, Miles was served 23 out of
25 meals required under the consent decree.  Aramark also introduced evidence showing
that the juice, milk, and tea were certified Kosher while Miles counters only with his own
allegation that the food logs were forged and that the drinks were not Kosher.  Further,
the margarine was a separately wrapped condiment for which Aramark was contractually
unable to provide a substitute.  Therefore, Aramark substantially performed its end of the
bargain under the consent decree and was therefore entitled to dismissal of the suit.
Next, Miles challenges the District Court’s March 28, 2007 order denying his
request to withdraw the consent order.  Miles, through counsel, stated that he wished to
withdraw the order because he “changed his mind.”  The District Court properly applied
the principles of contract interpretation to find an offer, acceptance and consideration in
upholding the consent decree.  See Yarnall v. Almy, 703 A.2d 535, 538 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1997).  Further, it would have prejudiced Aramark to allow Miles to withdraw the decree
five days before the start of Passover, since it relied on the consent decree to resolve the
      To the extent that Miles alleges judicial misconduct and bias by the district judge, we2
find no evidence of such misconduct or bias in the record.
      Admittedly Faretta concerned the right to self-representation in a criminal trial, but3
we are not prepared to hold that a litigant’s invocation of the statutory right to self-
representation in civil cases requires a less clear and unequivocal assertion.  See Faretta,
422 U.S. at 831 (noting that the statutory right to self-representation was signed one day
7
litigation and to provide Miles with Kosher meals.
  Miles also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the
District Court proceedings.  However, in ordinary civil disputes, parties may not obtain
relief from the ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d
369, 381 (3d Cir. 2003) (Rendell, J., dissenting).   Even if such relief were available to
Miles, the record does not support a finding that his counsel was ineffective.2
Finally, Miles asserts that the District Court denied his Sixth Amendment right to
self-representation.  However, the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil proceedings. 
See generally Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608 (1993) (protections provided by
the Sixth Amendment are explicitly confined to criminal prosecutions).  There is a federal
statute that guarantees litigants the right to self-representation in civil cases.  See 28
U.S.C. § 1654.  In order to invoke the right, a litigant must clearly and unequivocally
request the right to proceed pro se.  Cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) 
(holding that a defendant properly invoked his right to self-representation when he
“clearly and unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself
and did not want counsel”).   While Miles references a motion he filed in the District3
before the Sixth Amendment was proposed); Iannacone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d
Cir. 1998).      
      It appears that the District Court did not rule on this motion. 4
      Appellant’s motion to expand the record is denied.5
                                                                  8
Court requesting to represent himself, the only motion on the record is one filed by Miles’
counsel requesting to withdraw and stating that Miles was prepared to proceed pro se.  4
That motion, however, is not a clear and unequivocal assertion of the right to self-
representation.  Therefore, this claim is also without merit.   5
 
